Additional Reference Material
1. Hogan (1973, 1975), for example, feels that it is dangerous for people to place their own principles above society and the law. It may be that many psychologists react to Kohlberg in a similar way, and that this reaction underlies many of the debates over the scientific merits of his research.
2. Others have argued that Kohlberg’s stages are culturally biased. Simpson (1974), for example, says that Kohlberg has developed a stage model based on the Western philosophical tradition and has then applied this model to non-Western cultures without considering the extent to which they have different moral outlooks.
3. This criticism may have merit. One wonders how well Kohlberg’s stages apply to the great Eastern philosophies. One also wonders if his stages do justice to moral development in many traditional village cultures. Researchers find that villagers stop at stage 3, but perhaps they continue to develop moralities in directions that Kohlberg’s stages fail to capture. 
Another criticism is that Kohlberg’s theory is sex-biased, a view that has been thoughtfully expressed by one of Kohlberg’s associates and co-authors, Carol Gilligan (1982). Gilligan observes that Kohlberg’s stages were derived exclusively from interviews with males, and she charges that the stages reflect a decidedly male orientation. For males, advanced moral thought revolves around rules, rights, and abstract principles. The ideal is formal justice, in which all parties evaluate one another’s claims in an impartial manner. This conception of morality, Gilligan argues, fails to capture the distinctly female voice on moral matters.
4. For women, Gilligan says, morality centers not on rights and rules but on interpersonal relationships and the ethics of compassion and care. The ideal is not impersonal justice but more affiliative ways of living. Women’s morality, in addition, is more contextualized; it is tied to real, ongoing relationships rather than abstract solutions to hypothetical dilemmas.
Because of these sex differences, Gilligan says, men and women frequently score at different stages on Kohlberg’s scale. Women typically score at stage 3, with its focus on interpersonal feelings, whereas men more commonly score at stages 4 and 5, which reflect more abstract conceptions of social organization. Thus, women score lower than men. If, however, Kohlberg’s scale were more sensitive to women’s distinctly interpersonal orientations, it would show that women also continue to develop their thinking beyond stage 3.
Gilligan has made an initial effort to trace women’s moral development. Since she believes that women’s conceptions of care and affiliation are embedded in real-life situations, she has interviewed women facing a personal crisis–the decision to have an abortion. Through these interviews, Gilligan has tried to show that women move from a conventional to a post conventional mode of thinking. That is, they no longer consider their responsibilities in terms of what is conventionally expected, of them but in terms of their own insights into the ethics of care and responsibility.
Not everyone agrees with Gilligan’s critique. Rest (1983), in particular, argues that Gilligan has exaggerated the extent of the sex differences found on Kohlberg’s scale. An evaluation of this question, however, must await closer reviews of the literature.
In the meantime, Gilligan has raised an interesting theoretical possibility. Like Werner, she is suggesting that development may proceed along more than one line. One line of moral thought focuses on logic, justice, and social organization, the other on interpersonal relationships. If this is so, there is the further possibility that these two lines at some point become integrated within each sex. That is, each sex might become more responsive to the dominant orientation of the other. Perhaps, as Gilligan briefly suggests (1982, Ch. 6), this integration is a major task of the adult years. (For further thoughts in this vein, see Chapter 14 on Jung’s theory of adult development.)
There are other criticisms of Kohlberg’s work. Many of these have to do with empirical matters, such as the problem of invariant sequence, the prevalence of regression, and the relationships between thought and action. Since I have mentioned these earlier, I would like to conclude with a more general question. Kohlberg writes in a forceful manner and he promotes stage 6 as if it provides the decision-making tools we need for the toughest ethical dilemmas.
If you read the original application you will notice that the new application omits all details previously referenced to discipline, and the school culture is now reduced to 10 must haves– in a view short months did they totally decide that their culture was wrong and did not replace it with anything?
 
 
 
1. Walker, Lawrence J. “The Sequentially of Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development.” Child Development 53.5 (1982): 1330. Print.
2. W.C. Crain. (1985). Theories of Development. Prentice-Hall. pp. 118-136.
3. W.C. Crain. (1985). Theories of Development. Prentice-Hall. pp. 118-136.
4. Kohlberg’s Moral Stages – faculty.plts.edu/gpence/html/kohlberg.htm